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Abstract We investigate the relative probabilistic support afforded by the combi-
nation of two analogies based on possibly different, structural similarity (as opposed
to e.g. shared predicates) within the context of Pure Inductive Logic and under the
assumption of Language Invariance. We show that whilst repeated analogies
grounded on the same structural similarity only strengthen the probabilistic support
this need not be the case when combining analogies based on different structural
similarities. That is, two analogies may provide less support than each would
individually.
Keywords The counterpart principle  Structural similarity  Analogy  Inductive
logic  Logical probability  Rationality  Uncertain reasoning
1 Introduction
Suppose that I am considering how likely it is that my son would enjoy a visit to the
cinema to see The Sound of Music. Thinking about it I recall that last year he did
enjoy seeing Toy Story which somewhat enhances my belief that he will also enjoy
The Sound of Music. I then remember my aunt telling me how much she enjoyed it.
Should this now further increase the probability I would give to my son liking it?
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Here is an example of two facts which individually seem to provide analogical
support for my son liking The Sound of Music yet in combination they seem to be
pulling in different directions and possibly canceling each other out. (Like enjoying
curry and rhubarb crumble but not both at the same time!)
The plan in this paper is to investigate this issue of combining analogical support
(at least up to two such supports) within the context of Pure Inductive Logic (PIL for
short). Of course since this version of Carnapian Inductive Logic considers the
assignment of rational, or logical, probability in the absence of any intended
interpretation of the language on closer scrutiny the above example hardly seems
relevant (since we already know a great deal about films, aunts, etc. so they are very
far indeed from being uninterpreted). Nevertheless it still seems to us interesting to
consider this question ‘in vacuo’, in other words as a nascent artificial agent might
do.
Within philosophy, and similarly in AI and psychology, there is a considerable
literature on analogy, see Bartha’s (2013, 2009) for an excellent overview. Bartha
however explicitly avoids considering approaches to analogical reasoning within the
general framework of Carnap’s Inductive Logic, as found for example in Carnap
(1952, 1980), Carnap and Stegmu¨ller (1959), Costantini (1983), Festa (1996),
Huttegger (2014), Kuipers (2000, 1984), Maher (2000, 2001), Maio (1995),
Niiniluoto (1981, 1988), Pietarinen (1972), Romeijn (2006), Skyrms (1993), Spohn
(1981), Welch (1999).1 It is within this framework, more specifically within PIL and
directly following on from the earlier (Hill et al. 2011; Hill and Paris 2013a, b;
Howarth et al. 2016; Paris and Vencovska´ 2015), that this present paper is set.
Working within such a mathematical setting has the advantage of precision and
permanence, a correct theorem cannot be denied only at worst put aside as
irrelevant, though we will argue later that results in this formal backwater do have
relevance within the wider ambit.
2 Notation and Context
The context of this paper is PIL as explained, for example, in Paris (2015) and Paris
and Vencovska´ (2015). Thus we have a language L with relation symbols
R1;R2; . . .;Rq, say of finite arities r1; r2; . . .; rq respectively, and constants an for
n 2 Nþ ¼ f1; 2; 3; . . .g, and no function symbols nor equality.2 Let SL denote the
set of first order sentences of this language L.
We are interested in picking a rational probability function w on SL, i.e. a
function w : SL ! ½0; 1 such that for h;/; 9xwðxÞ 2 SL
(P1) If  h then wðhÞ ¼ 1,
(P2) If  :ðh ^ /Þ then wðh _ /Þ ¼ wðhÞ þ wð/Þ,
(P3) wð9xwðxÞÞ ¼ limm!1 wð
Wm
i¼1 wðaiÞÞ;
1 See Hill (2013), Hill and Paris (2013a) for some discussion of this literature.
2 We identify L with the set fR1;R2; . . .;Rqg.
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where rational is customarily identified with w satisfying certain arguably rational
principles. Whilst there is currently no clear consensus on what these principles
should be one that is very widely adopted.
The Principle of Constant Exchangeability, Ex. A probability function w on SL
satisfies Constant Exchangeability if, for any permutation r of 1; 2; . . . and
hða1; . . .; amÞ 2 SL,
wðhðarð1Þ; . . .; arðmÞÞÞ ¼ wðhða1; . . .; amÞÞ:
All the probability functions considered in this paper will be assumed to satisfy Ex.
A second similar principle.
The Principle of Predicate Exchangeability, Px If Ri;Rj are relation symbols of
Lq, of the same arity, then for h 2 SL,
wðhÞ ¼ wðh0Þ
where h0 is the result of transposing Ri;Rj throughout h.
Px necessarily differs from Ex as far as our default language L is concerned in
that L has infinitely many constant symbols but only finitely many relation
symbols.3 If w satisfying Ex ? Px can be extended to a probability function w1
on the sentences of a language L1 with infinitely many relation symbols of each
arity and continue to satisfy Ex ? Px we say that w satisfies Language Invariance,
Li. This is a stronger condition on w than simply satisfying Ex ? Px nevertheless
it holds widely for the main probability functions considered in this subject, for
example Carnap’s Continuum of Inductive Methods. It is also arguably rational on
the grounds that the probability assigned to a sentence h should surely not depend
on the presence or otherwise of relation symbols in the overlying language which
are not mentioned in h. This amounts to the requirement that a rational probability
function on a language L should be extendible to a rational probability function on
any larger language, and once Px is taken as a condition for rationality this is
equivalent to Li by a sequential compactness argument (see Paris and Vencovska´
for more details).
3 The Results
In Hill and Paris (2013b) a further putative rationality principle was proposed based
on ‘probabilistic analogical support by structural similarity’:4
3 In the study of PIL there are good reasons for this differing treatment, in particular almost all principles
currently being considered are adequately captured in languages with only finitely many relation symbols,
unlike the case for constants.
4 This underlying conception of analogy is similar to that employed in Structure-Mapping Theory in AI,
see Gentner (1983).
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The Counterpart Principle, CP Let h; h0 2 SL be such that h0 is the result of
replacing some constant/relation symbols in h by new constant/relation symbols not
occurring in h. Then5
wðh j h0Þ wðhÞ:
For example in the case where R1 was unary and R2;R3 binary and
h ¼ :R1ða1Þ ^ 9x R2ðx; a2Þ
we could have that
h0 ¼ :R1ða3Þ ^ 9x R3ðx; a2Þ
and this instance of CP would give
wð:R1ða1Þ ^ 9x R2ðx; a2Þ j :R1ða3Þ ^ 9x R3ðx; a2ÞÞwð:R1ða1Þ ^ 9x R2ðx; a2ÞÞ:
We are thinking of h and h0 in the statement of CP as capturing what is meant by
structural similarity, that they have exactly the same syntactic form, only some
names have changed. For example, purely in terms of the syntax and in the absence
of any interpretation my aunt enjoying The Sound of Music at Christmas is struc-
turally similar to my son enjoying The Sound of Music on his birthday. For such
structurally similar h; h0 just Ex ? Px force that they must get the same probability.
The Counterpart Principle adds to this formal connection by asserting that there is
also a material connection in that conditioning on h0 enhances (or at least does not
diminish) the probability of h.
Relating CP to the common format of analogical reasoning within philosophy as
a whole (Bartha 2013), gives a Candidate Analogical Inference Rule (R) saying, in
short, that having a mapping  from a source domain S to a target domain T the
plausibility of a proposition Q holding in T given that Q holds in S should be
stronger the more features h; h the domains have in common as opposed to features
on which they differ. Within this template CP corresponds to the null case where
any evidence of matching/dismatching features is absent (a case that Bartha does
not treat). In fact as we shall explain in the penultimate section allowing in even one
such matching feature can, rather unexpectedly, destroy the analogical support in
the way we are measuring it.
The general pattern of support by analogy that CP endeavours to capture seems to
be rather common in our everyday lives, and in science. For example learning that
every natural number can be proved to be the sum of four squares might well cause
one to guess that every natural number can also be proved to be the sum of nine
cubes. From such familiarity one might then feel that there was possibly a case to
argue for the rationality of CP. In fact we do not really need to do so since by the
following theorem from (Hill and Paris 2013b) it is actually inherited from Li.
5 Throughout we avoid any problems of conditioning on sentences with zero probability by identifying,
for example, wð/ jwÞwðg j fÞ with wð/ ^ wÞ  wðfÞwðg ^ fÞ  wðwÞ:
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Theorem 1 Li implies CP.
In a sense one might say that this theorem provides one answer to the question
raised by Hesse (1966), as to what is the philosophical justification for analogical
reasoning. For whenever we reason it is necessary to simply discard almost
everything we know—there is just too much of it to fully incorporate. We must ring
fence a tiny fraction of it that we consider relevant and reason simply on the basis of
that knowledge. Theorem 1 tells us that if all we consider relevant is our knowledge
that h0 holds and we assign probabilities rationally, in the sense of satisfying Li (and
Ex) then the probability of h will be enhanced.6 From this viewpoint the derived
analogical support arises through adopting Li.
Still we should emphasize here that what is ‘derived’ is an increased belief in h
within the ring fence. Whether or not this has any relevance to beliefs in the wider
world outside the ring fence depends on how far we can accept the ring fence
assumption.7 It should also be made clear that we are not claiming that this
increased belief equates with increased probability of being ‘true’ in any objective
sense. But what it might be argued to provide is plausibility, and in turn the impetus
to attempt to confirm a truth, though no more than that. For example the discovery
that every natural number is the sum of 4 ¼ 22 squares might equally have
encouraged mathematicians to try to prove that every natural number is the sum of
23 ¼ 8 cubes rather than 32 ¼ 9 cubes.
As a further development of the idea of structural similarity as embodied in CP
the following result is shown in Paris and Vencovska´ (2015):
Theorem 2 Suppose that h; h0; h00 2 SL are such that h0 is the result of replacing
some constant/relation symbols in h by new constant/relation symbols not
occurring in h and similarly h00 is the result of replacing some constant/relation
symbols in h0 by new constant/relation symbols not occurring in h or h0. Then for w
satisfying Li,8
wðh j h0Þ wðh j h00Þ: ð1Þ
Carrying on from the above example then this gives that
6 Or at least not diminished—the conditions for merely equality in CP are rather messy but in our view
sufficiently ‘unnatural’ as to offer no serious grounds on which to criticize CP, see Hill and Paris (2013b)
for more details.
7 Possibly this explains the force of analogy in mathematics and science where the outside world
according to our current view is so structured and lawlike.
8 With nothing more than complicating the notation we could also add to the conditioning sentences a
sentence w provided that none of the relation and constant symbols which replace or are replaced in the
passage from h to h0 to h00 appear in w. This remark also applies to Theorem 3.
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wð:R1ða1Þ ^ 9x R2ðx; a2Þ j :R1ða3Þ ^ 9x R3ðx; a2ÞÞ
wð:R1ða1Þ ^ 9x R2ðx; a2Þ j :R1ða3Þ ^ 9x R3ðx; a4ÞÞ:
For h; h0; h00 as in this theorem there is a clear sense in which h0 is structurally at least
as similar to h as h00 is. In other words there is a sense of distance, or degree of
similarity, the nearer h0 is to h the more analogical support it provides. In summary
then we could say that Theorem 1 tells us that h0 provides ‘analogical support by
structural similarity’ for h under the assumption that w satisfies Li and Theorem 2
tells us that the closer the analogy (i.e. structural similarity) the stronger the ana-
logical support.
Theorem 2 raises the question of what the effect is of combining multiple such
analogies and more generally what is the algebra of analogical support by similarity
in the presence of Li? We will certainly not answer that question in this paper but
will settle for elucidating the situation when ‘multiple’ is weakened to ‘two, at
most’.
In order to state our results, which will be proved in full in the next section, it will
be useful to sketch an artifice in the proof of Theorem 2 as given in (Paris and
Vencovska´ 2015) because it enables us to reduce these questions to a particularly
simple form. Leaving implicit any constant and relation symbols common to them




where the B~1;B~2;C~1;C~2;D~1;D~2;D~3 are entirely disjoint blocks of distinct constant
and/or relation symbols and the B~1;B~2 are matching in terms of the positions of
constant and relation symbols, and similarly for the C~;D~. So for example if B~1 ¼
ha1;R1;R2gt with R1 unary and R2 ternary then B~2 must similarly be of the form
hak;Rm;Rggt with Rm unary, Rg ternary.
Let the probability function w on SL satisfy Li and as explained above let w1 be
the extension of w to SL1 satisfying Ex ? Px. Let B~n for n[ 2 be blocks of totally
new relation and constant symbols from L1 matching B~1 and similarly produce
C~n;D~n matching C~1, D~1 respectively, so that no constant or relation symbol appears
in more than one block of any sort. Notice that since w1 extends w and satisfies Ex
? Px to show that wðh j h0Þ wðh j h00Þ it is enough to show that
w1ðhðB~1;C~2;D~2Þ j hðB~1;C~3;D~3ÞÞ  w1ðhðB~1;C~2;D~2Þ j hðB~3;C~4;D~4ÞÞ: ð2Þ
Let L be the language with a single binary relation symbol R. Define a probability
function v on SL by
vðRðai; ajÞÞ ¼ w1 hðB~i;C~j;D~jÞ
 
and more generally












where the i;j 2 f0; 1g and R1 ¼ R;R0 ¼ :R; etc. (By a theorem of Gaifman, see
Gaifman (1964) or Paris and Vencovska´ (2015), v extends uniquely to a probability
function on SL satisfying Ex.)
Referring to Paris and Vencovska´ (2015, p. 187) for the details it can now be
shown that for v satisfying Ex,
vðRða1; a2Þ jRða1; a3ÞÞ vðRða1; a2Þ jRða3; a4ÞÞ: ð3Þ
But this is just another way of formulating the inequality (2).
From this sketch we see that to show that (1) holds for w satisfying Li it is enough
to show that (3) holds for a probability function v on SL satisfying Ex.
We shall use the same method to investigate other simple cases of ‘analogical
support by (multiple) instances of structural similarity’. Note that any probability
function on SL satisfying Ex also satisfies Li: for L has just one (binary) relation
symbol and if v is a probability function on a language with at most one relation
symbol of each arity which satisfies Ex then v trivially satisfies Px and also satisfies
Li since we can just introduce relation symbols which for each arity are identical (to
within the name). Hence showing above that (1) held for w satisfying Li was in fact
equivalent to showing that (3) held for v on SL satisfying Ex; any v on SL satisfying
Ex and failing (3) would have provided a counterexample to (1) satisfying Li.
This observation leads us to concentrate on deciding which inequalities must hold
between
(a) wðRða1; a2ÞÞ
(b) wðRða1; a2Þ jRða3; a4ÞÞ (c) wðRða1; a2Þ jRða1; a4ÞÞ
(d) wðRða1; a2Þ jRða3; a4Þ ^ Rða5; a6ÞÞ (e) wðRða1; a2Þ jRða1; a4Þ ^ Rða5; a6ÞÞ
(f) wðRða1; a2Þ jRða1; a4Þ ^ Rða1; a6ÞÞ (g) wðRða1; a2Þ jRða1; a4Þ ^ Rða5; a2ÞÞ
for w a probability function on SL satisfying Ex. In other words we are interested in
comparing the degrees of support afforded by up two individually structurally
similar sentences.9 To illustrate these within a less formal context suppose that we
read ‘enjoys’ for R, ‘my son’ for a1, The Sound of Music for a2 and so on. Then
(a) would correspond, ceteris paribus, to the probability I would give to my son
enjoying The Sound of Music, (c) to his enjoying it on my recalling that he enjoyed
Toy Story and (g) to when I also recalled that my aunt enjoying the sound of music.
Likewise (b) would correspond to the probability I would give to my son enjoying
The Sound of Music just given that my work colleague enjoyed Toy Story.10 (Of
9 This is not an exhaustive list of such conditionals, a point we shall return to later.
10 It is of course essential in these cases that one treats them purely as given without introducing any
further knowledge or interpretation. Difficult as this is for anything but a nascent artificial agent, still it is
the case that in everyday reasoning we do ring fence the available information between relevant and
irrelevant. All we ask of our reader here is that they use ring fencing that includes only what is explicitly
given.
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course this informal example is very special because in the general case, as indi-
cated in the earlier, R will correspond to a template for a sentence and the ai blocks
of constants and/or relations.)
The answers we obtain are given by the following Fig. 1 where a connection
from x to y by upward sloping lines than means that y is always at least as large as
x (and for some w strictly larger) whilst in unconnected cases the inequality can go
either way. In each case, as above, establishing the inequality here provides a
corresponding inequality for the more general case of multiple analogical support
whilst a counterexample to the inequality holding itself provides a counterexample
to the corresponding theorem for multiple analogical support.
So, with the above ring fence assumptions in place, (a)  (b) prescribes that the
probability I would give that my son will enjoy The Sound of Music should not be
diminished when I recall his previously enjoying Toy Story. Similarly (d)  (g)
would prescribe one giving at least as much probability to the generalized Pell’s
equation x2  3y2 ¼ 6 having a solution when judging (just!) on the basis of x2 
3y2 ¼ 1 and x2  10y2 ¼ 6 having solutions than when judging instead on the basis
of x2  5y2 ¼ 4 and x2  2y2 ¼ 1 having solutions.
Each of these inequalities then corresponds to a ‘Principle of Analogical Support
by Structural Similarity’ satisfied by a probability function satisfying Li. For
example (b)  (e) gives that for w satisfying Li,
wð9x R2ðx; a3Þ j 9x R3ðx; a5ÞÞwð9x R2ðx; a3Þ j 9x R2ðx; a5Þ ^ 9x R3ðx; a2ÞÞ
whilst we cannot in general conclude that for such a w the instance
wð9x R2ðx; a3Þ j 9x R3ðx; a5Þ ^ 9x R4ðx; a2ÞÞwð9x R2ðx; a3Þ j 9x R2ðx; a5ÞÞ
of (d)  (c) holds.
As we shall see for the most part the inequalities and incompatibilities in the
above diagram will be straightforward to show. The main novelty in this paper is in





Fig. 1 The relationships between (a)–(g)
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4 The Proofs
We now set about proving that the inequalities indicated in the above diagram are
all that necessarily hold for w a probability function on SL satisfying Ex. We shall
start by giving the positive results. In order to do this, as well as to later furnish
some counterexamples, we need to recall (and slightly rejig) the Representation
Theorem for polyadic probability functions as given in (Paris and Vencovska´
2015, Chapter 25) the special case of the language L as above.







to be the probability of (uniformly) randomly picking, with replacement, hð1Þ; hð2Þ;
. . .; hðnÞ from f1; 2; . . .;Ng such that for each i; j n, dhðiÞ;hðjÞ ¼ i;j. This uniquely
determines a probability function on SL satisfying Ex. (For details see e.g. Paris and
Vencovska´ 2015, Chapter 7).
Clearly convex mixtures of these wD also satisfy Ex. The converse (that any
probability function satisfying Ex is a convex mixture of these wD) does not hold but
as shown in (Paris and Vencovska´ 2015, Chapter 25) if we move to a suitable non-
standard universe and take N to be a non-standard integer then any probability
function w on SL satisfying Ex is a convex mixture (as an integral) of the standard
parts 
wD of wD from this non-standard universe (see Paris and Vencovska´ 2015,
Theorem 25.1). The important point to take away from this as far as this paper is
concerned is that it is sometimes enough to check whether an inequality holds for
these 
wD and since the mathematics is exactly the same it is just as good to check it
for the wD for standard N.
Given this observation, it turns out that that (d)  (g) is a consequence of the
following theorem whose rather messy proof is given in Paris and Vencovska´.
Theorem 3 Let ðdi;jÞ be an N 	 N f0; 1g-matrix such that
P










Given this inequality we can now prove the main theorem of this paper which
shows that (d)  (g).
Theorem 4 Let w be a probability function on the sentences of the binary
language L ¼ fRg satisfying Ex. Then
wðRða1; a2Þ jRða1; a3Þ ^ Rða4; a2ÞÞwðRða1; a2Þ jRða3; a4Þ ^ Rða5; a6ÞÞ:
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Proof For D an N 	 N f0; 1g-matrix and n 6¼ m, wDðRðan; amÞÞ is the probability
of picking hðnÞ; hðmÞ 2 f1; 2; . . .;Ng such that dhðnÞ;hðmÞ ¼ 1. In other words




Hence, since the choices h(1), h(2), h(3), h(4), h(5), h(6) are all independent,






Likewise wDðRða1; a2Þ ^ Rða1; a3Þ ^ Rða4; a2ÞÞ is the probability of picking
h(1), h(2) such that dhð1Þ;hð2Þ ¼ 1 and then (independently) picking h(3), h(4) such
that dhð1Þ;hð3Þ ¼ 1 and dhð4Þ;hð2Þ ¼ 1: For a particular choice of h(1), h(2) these latter





























and combined with (4) we obtain that
wDðRða1; a2Þ ^ Rða1; a3Þ ^ Rða4; a2ÞÞwDðRða1; a2Þ ^ Rða3; a4Þ ^ Rða5; a6ÞÞ:
Being a linear inequality this also holds for convex mixtures of the wD so by the
Representation Theorem (Paris and Vencovska´ 2015, Theorem 25.1)
wðRða1; a2Þ ^ Rða1; a3Þ ^ Rða4; a2ÞÞwðRða1; a2Þ ^ Rða3; a4Þ ^ Rða5; a6ÞÞ
for any probability function w on SL satisfying Ex. Since by Ex
wðRða1; a3Þ ^ Rða4; a2ÞÞ ¼ wðRða3; a4Þ ^ Rða5; a6ÞÞ
the denominators of the conditional probabilities on both sides of the inequality in
the statement of the theorem are the same and the required result now follows. h
Along similar lines, although much easier, we can show that (d)  (e). For, when
T ¼Pi;j di;j ¼
P
i Ai as before,
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wDðRða1; a2Þ ^ Rða3; a4Þ ^ Rða5; a6ÞÞ ¼ T3N6











follows by Ho¨lder’s Inequality. Thus for w a probability function on SL satisfying
Ex,
wðRða1; a2Þ ^ Rða3; a4Þ ^ Rða5; a6ÞÞwðRða1; a2Þ ^ Rða1; a4Þ ^ Rða5; a6ÞÞ:
Since w satisfies Ex,
wðRða3; a4Þ ^ Rða5; a6ÞÞ ¼ wðRða1; a4Þ ^ Rða5; a6ÞÞ
and (d)  (e) follows.
Turning to the other positive inequalities, (a)  (b) is just Theorem 1 whilst (b)
 (d) and (c)  (f) follow similarly by applying the Principle of Instantial
Relevance, PIR, see Gaifman (1971), Humburg (1971), Paris and Vencovska´ (2015)
(or for the former using the footnote to Theorem 2). Furthermore, (b)  (c) is (3).
We now address the inequalities that do not (necessarily) hold. To give a
counterexample to (c)  (g) consider w ¼ wD where D is an N 	 N f0; 1g-matrix.
In this case, with the above abbreviations,








Letting D be the 6 	 6 matrix
1 1 1 0 0 0
0 0 0 1 0 0
0 0 0 1 0 0
0 0 0 0 1 0
0 0 0 0 1 0
0 0 0 0 0 1
gives values to (5), (6) of 9 / 32 and 7 / 24 respectively, and provides the required
counterexample. This same probability function also gives a counterexample to (e)
 (g) [(hence also to (e)  (d)].
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where v is any cL1k of Carnap’s Continuum of Inductive Methods
11 for the unary
language L1 ¼ fPg with 0\k\1. In this case (d)  (c) becomes
cL1k ðPða2Þ jPða4Þ ^ Pða6ÞÞ cL1k ðPða2Þ jPða4ÞÞ:
Putting in the actual values here gives
2 þ 21k
2 þ k 
1 þ 21k
1 þ k
which is false for k in this range.
Similarly this probability function also gives counterexamples to (e)  (c), (f)
 (c) and (b)  (a).
We now describe a counterexample to (g)  (f) . Let v be a probability function
on the sentences of the language fP1;P2;P3; . . .g where the Pi are unary, satisfying












Then w satisfies Ex and the instance of (g)  (f) for this w becomes
vðP2ða1Þ jP4ða1Þ ^ P6ða1ÞÞ vðP2ða1Þ jP3ða1Þ ^ P2ða4ÞÞ
and this can be seen to fail for the probability function v which treats the predicates
as stochastically independent and identically distributed as, say, cL12 on L1 ¼ fPg.
This same probability function furnishes a counterexample to (g)  (e) and (g) 
(d).
To show that we do not have (c)  (e) let D1;D2 be respectively the 4 	 4
matrices
1 1 1 1
1 0 0 0
1 0 0 0
1 0 0 0
1 1 0 0
1 1 0 0
1 1 0 0
1 1 0 0
Then,
11 See Carnap (1952), or in the notation of this paper (Paris and Vencovska´ 2015, Chapter 16).
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wD1ðRða1; a4ÞÞ ¼ 7=16;
wD1ðRða1; a4Þ ^ Rða5; a6ÞÞ ¼ ð7=16Þ2;
wD1ðRða1; a2Þ ^ Rða1; a4ÞÞ ¼ ð42 þ 12 þ 12 þ 12Þ=43 ¼ 19=64;
wD1ðRða1; a2Þ ^ Rða1; a4Þ ^ Rða5; a6ÞÞ ¼ ð19=64Þ 	 ð7=16Þ ¼ 133=1024;
wD2ðRða1; a4ÞÞ ¼ 8=16 ¼ 1=2;
wD2ðRða1; a4Þ ^ Rða5; a6ÞÞ ¼ ð1=2Þ2 ¼ 1=4;
wD2ðRða1; a2Þ ^ Rða1; a4ÞÞ ¼ ð22 þ 22 þ 22 þ 22Þ=43 ¼ 1=4;
wD2ðRða1; a2Þ ^ Rða1; a4Þ ^ Rða5; a6ÞÞ ¼ ð1=4 	 ð1=2Þ ¼ 1=8:
Hence for w ¼ ðwD1 þ wD2Þ=2;
wðRða1; a2Þ jRða1; a4ÞÞ ¼ ð19=64Þ þ ð1=4Þð7=16Þ þ ð1=2Þ ¼ 7=12;
wðRða1; a2Þ jRða1; a4Þ ^ Rða5; a6ÞÞ ¼ ð133=1024Þ þ ð1=8Þð7=16Þ2 þ ð1=4Þ ¼ 261=452;
giving a counterexample to (c)  (e).
Finally to give an example where (d)  (f) fails let E1;E2, respectively, be the






wE1ðRða1; a4Þ ^ Rða1; a6ÞÞ ¼ ð22 þ 22Þ=23 ¼ 1;
wE1ðRða1; a2Þ ^ Rða1; a4Þ ^ Rða1; a6ÞÞ ¼ 1;
wE1ðRða3; a4Þ ^ Rða5; a6ÞÞ ¼ 1;
wE1ðRða1; a2Þ ^ Rða3; a4Þ ^ Rða5; a6ÞÞ ¼ 1;
wE2ðRða1; a4Þ ^ Rða1; a6ÞÞ ¼ ð12 þ 02Þ=23 ¼ 1=8;
wE2ðRða1; a2Þ ^ Rða1; a4Þ ^ Rða1; a6ÞÞ ¼ ð13 þ 03Þ=24 ¼ 1=16;
wE2ðRða3; a4Þ ^ Rða5; a6ÞÞ ¼ ð1=4Þ 	 ð1=4Þ ¼ 1=16;
wE2ðRða1; a2Þ ^ Rða3; a4Þ ^ Rða5; a6ÞÞ ¼ ð1=64Þ;
Hence for w ¼ ðwE1 þ wE2Þ=2;
wðRða1; a2Þ jRða1; a4Þ ^ Rða1; a6ÞÞ ¼ 1 þ ð1=16Þ
1 þ ð1=8Þ ;
wðRða1; a2Þ jRða3; a4Þ ^ Rða5; a6ÞÞ ¼ 1 þ ð1=64Þ
1 þ ð1=16Þ ;
giving a counterexample to (d)  (f).
Combining Analogical Support in Pure Inductive Logic 413
123
Combining the inequalities and non-inequalities produced above now gives
exactly the relationships indicated in Fig. (1).
As already mentioned (a)–(g) do not form an exhaustive list of all such
conditionals with at most two individually structurally similar sentences. Firstly
each of these has a ‘mirror image’ formed by transposing the two coordinates, for
example
(e) wðRða1; a2Þ jRða1; a4Þ ^ Rða5; a6ÞÞ; (e’) wðRða2; a1Þ jRða4; a1Þ ^ Rða6; a5ÞÞ:
Of these (a), (b), (d), (g) are the same as their mirror images while for the others it is
easy to see by the device used with (7) or (8) that including them in Fig. (1) does not
give any new vertical lines beyond those already present in the mirror image of
Fig. (1).
More significantly we have left for future consideration the seemingly thorny
cases of conditionals where the two supporting structurally similar sentences
contain common constants which are not also common to the conditioned sentence,
for example wðRða1; a2Þ jRða1; a3Þ ^ Rða4; a3ÞÞ:
5 Other Analogy Principles in PIL
In this short section we briefly mention some other analogy principles which have
been suggested within the context of PIL as being in some sense rational. Ideally
such principles will both capture a facet of analogical support as we intuit it and be
consequences of other established and acknowledged rational principles (such as is
the case with the Counterpart Principle) from which they too will inherit this status.
Failing that they will present and formalize altogether new aspects of what might be
understood as rational though their acceptability will then to a large degree hinge on
their being consistent with other established and acknowledged rational principles.
Already in the joint paper (Carnap and Stegmu¨ller 1959) with Stegmu¨ller Carnap
was interested in the idea of analogical support within the context of his (unary)
Inductive Logic and this was to continue right up to (Carnap 1980, Chapter 16). The
probability functions ck of Carnap’s Continuum of Inductive Methods were too
restrictive to encompass modeling the sort of analogical effects that Carnap had in
mind which has led a number of investigators to propose instead various mixtures,
products and generalizations of the ck, see for example Carnap (1954, 1980),
Costantini (1983), Festa (1996), Hesse (1964), Huttegger (2014), Kuipers (1984),
Maher (2000, 2001), Maio (1995), Niiniluoto (1981), Romeijn (2006), Skyrms
(1993), Spohn (1981). Such approaches however have so far still failed to fully
achieve the required effects see for example Kuipers (2000, p. 81), Hill et al.
(2011), Hill and Paris (2013a), Maher (2001), Pietarinen (1972), Spohn (1981),
Welch (1999). Furthermore being largely chosen to satisfy a property rather than
being derived as the functions characterizing some concrete, arguably rational,
principles they seem to us to suffer from a certain arbitrariness in the choices of the
constituent functions, factors.
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Two notable exceptions founded on general principles are (Maio 1995; Maher
2000). Unfortunately neither seem entirely satisfactory, di Maio’s requires a
questionable (to our mind) linearity condition, (Maio 1995, II3, p. 378), and Maher’s
is effectively restricted to a language with at most two predicates (see Maher 2001).
In Carnap (1973) and Carnap and Stegmu¨ller (1959) the authors also suggested a
somewhat less arbitrary notion of analogical support by similarity12 based on sharing
properties and a derived notion of closeness. To explain this let R1;R2; . . .;Rq be, as
usual, the now all unary, predicates of L and let a1ðxÞ; a2ðxÞ; . . .; a2qðxÞ be the atoms
of L, that is the formulae of the form
R11 ðxÞ ^ R22 ðxÞ ^ . . . ^ Rqq ðxÞ








the analogical support afforded to amða2Þ by arða1Þ, in the absence of any further
information on a1; a2, was to be a decreasing function (in terms of the subset
ordering) of the set Dðar; amÞ ¼ fi j i ¼ dig.
More specifically Carnap’s writings suggest an analogy principle see Carnap
(1973, p. 320), Hill (2013, p. 101) of the form:
For atoms ar; am; ak, if Dðar; amÞ  Dðar; akÞ then
wðarðanþ2Þ j amðanþ1Þ ^
n^
i¼1




Using Johnson’s Sufficientness Postulate it is easy to see that this principle holds for
the probability functions ck in Carnap’s Continuum of Inductive Methods. Unfor-
tunately this is somewhat less satisfactory than it might initially appear because for
the cLk (9) holds with equality whenever m; k 6¼ r,13 hardly capturing the idea that
amðanþ1Þ’s support for arðanþ2Þ depends on the set of shared features. Several
families of probability functions are known which do satisfy (9) with strict subset
and inequality but currently no complete characterization is available see for
example D’Asaro (2014, Section 3), Hesse (1964), Maher (2000), Welch (1999).14
A second point on which (9) might be queried is the requirement that the standing
evidence should be of the form
Vn
i¼1 ahiðaiÞ, in other words a state description,
rather than, say, simply a sentence /ða1; a2; . . .; anÞ 2 QFSL. After all the
underlying intuition in both cases would seem to be no different. In fact allowing
this generalization has a significant effect. With the exception of cL0 ; c
L
1 the principle
12 In Carnap (1980) Carnap also has a notion of analogy by proximity but that essentially denies Ex so is
not under consideration here.
13 In the accounts related in this section the problem of conditional probabilities being undefined when
the denominator probability is zero was avoided by adopting the convention of treating
wðh j/Þwðh jwÞ (etc.) as an abbreviation for wðh ^ /ÞwðwÞwðh ^ wÞwð/Þ.
14 In fact with Atom Exchangeability and Regularity this characterizes the cLk for 0\k1, see
(D’Asaro and Paris).
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no longer holds for Carnap’s Continuum even when q ¼ 2. Indeed there are only a
very few further probability functions satisfying the principle (and Ex ? Px ?
SN15), see Hill and Paris (2013a) for a complete characterization, none of them
seemingly particularly attractive as a rational choice.
More recently several other analogy principles based on interpretations of the
earlier mentioned Candidate Analogical Inference Rule (R) of Bartha (2013), have
been investigated in the context of PIL, see Howarth et al. (2016), in particular a
version of this rule which prescribes that the more properties on which a target and
source agree (and the fewer on which they disagree) the more support there is that
the target will satisfy an additional property known to be satisfied by the source.
While this allows considerable freedom of formalization within PIL the basic
version seems to be the principle:
For hðanþ1; a~Þ;/ðanþ1; a~Þ 2 QFSL, where a~¼ ha1; a2; . . .; ani,
wð/ðanþ2; a~Þ j hðanþ1; a~Þ ^ hðanþ2; a~Þ ^ /ðanþ1; a~ÞÞwð/ðanþ2; a~Þ j/ðanþ1; a~ÞÞ:
That is the similarity of anþ1; anþ2 engendered by them both satisfying h argues that
anþ2 will satisfy / given that anþ1 does.
Unfortunately cL0 is the only probability function satisfying this principle
(together with Ex ? Px ? SN). In Howarth et al. (2016) various refinements of this
principle were considered some of which do follow from commonly accepted
rational principles within PIL. Nevertheless the failure of the above basic version
must put a question mark against this formalization of the underlying intuition
grounding rule (R), at least within the framework of PIL.
6 Conclusion
In this paper we have considered all possible variations of the Counterpart Principle
of Analogical Support by Structural Similarity which hold under the assumption of
Language Invariance, Li, when we allow up to two analogies and all relation/con-
stant symbols common to the conditioning conjuncts are also present in the
conditioned sentence.16 In summary these turn out to be generated by the template
of particular instances
(b) (a): wðRða1; a2Þ jRða3; a4ÞÞwðRða1; a2ÞÞ
(c) (b): wðRða1; a2Þ jRða1; a4ÞÞwðRða1; a2Þ jRða3; a4ÞÞ
(d) (b):wðRða1; a2Þ jRða3; a4Þ ^ Rða5; a6ÞÞwðRða1; a2Þ jRða3; a4ÞÞ
(e) (d):wðRða1; a2Þ jRða1; a4Þ ^ Rða5; a6ÞÞwðRða1; a2Þ jRða3; a4Þ ^ Rða5; a6ÞÞ
(g) (d):wðRða1; a2Þ jRða1; a4Þ ^ Rða5; a2ÞÞwðRða1; a2Þ jRða3; a4Þ ^ Rða5; a6ÞÞ
(f) (c):wðRða1; a2Þ jRða1; a4Þ ^ Rða1; a6ÞÞwðRða1; a2Þ jRða1; a4ÞÞ
15 SN is the Strong Negation Principle which asserts that if h0 is the result of replacing a relation symbol
R everywhere in h by :R then wðh0Þ ¼ wðhÞ.
16 In this paper the relationship of, say, wðRða1; a2Þ jRða1; a3Þ ^ Rða4; a3ÞÞ to (a)–(g) is not considered.
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for w a probability function on the language fRg satisfying Ex. By a template we
mean that Rðai; ajÞ may be replaced here by a sentence of a language L in which the
ai substitute for disjoint blocks of constant and/or relation symbols of L and w is
replaced by a probability function on L satisfying Li.
From (b)  (a), (d)  (b) and (f)  (c) we see that, as one might expect, more
analogies of the same structural similarity produce more support (or at least not
strictly less support) whilst from (c)  (b), (e)  (d) and (g)  (d) we have, again
not unexpectedly, that greater structural similarity gives greater analogical support.
More surprising are some of the inequalities which do not necessarily hold, for
example that we need not have (e) (c). Here adding to the conditioning Rða1; a4Þ
in (c) the analogous but more distantly similar Rða5; a6Þ can actually reduce the
analogical support, though support it remains since from (e)  (b), (b)  (a) we do
still have (e)  (a). In terms of our introductory example this says that although
adding the information about the aunt and The Sound of Music still leaves some
analogical support, it may in fact diminish the support provided by the Toy Story
evidence alone.
The results in this paper are clearly just the tip of the iceberg, for example we
have not considered the case where the underlying template involves not simply
binary R but ternary, 4-ary etc. Even in the case of binary R we have not considered
cases where constants common to the conditioning sentences are not also present in
the conditioned sentence. We have also not considered cases where we also have
negated analogies (as allowed by Bartha in his ‘Candidate Analogical Inference
Rule’ described in Howarth et al. 2016). Given our results so far, and the
technicalities needed to show them, the challenge of answering the apparently
limitless number of genuinely new questions that arise, and in turn of building those
answers into our understanding, seems formidable. Certainly at this juncture the
prospect of an elegant, meaningful general theory of multiple analogical support by
structural similarity can be no more than a matter of pure speculation.
Finally it is worth reminding ourselves that the results in this paper have been
derived on the assumption that one’s chosen rational probability function satisfies
just Li. In Polyadic Inductive Logic however there are a number of stronger
‘rationality principles’ which have been proposed, in particular Li with Spectrum
Exchangeability,17and it may be that making these further assumptions will produce
a different picture. Given our previous difficulties in attempting to generalize PIR to
this polyadic context (see Paris and Vencovska´ 2015, Chapter 36) that too would
look to be a challenging endeavour.18
Open Access This article is distributed under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution 4.0
International License (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/), which permits unrestricted use, dis-
tribution, and reproduction in any medium, provided you give appropriate credit to the original
17 In a nutshell Spectrum Exchangeability asserts that the probability of a state description should depend
only on the numbers of constants which look identical according to that state description and not on what
particular relations they satisfy, (see for example Paris and Vencovska´ 2015). It is a natural extension to
polyadic languages of Atom Exchangeability, so essentially Carnap’s Attribute Symmetry, (Carnap
1980, p. 77), for unary languages.
18 Another approach to PIR which may also shed some light on analogy can be found in Ronel and
Vencovska´ (2016).
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